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Over the past generation there have been significant reforms to the way the state supports the 
just resolution of legal disputes. Influenced by public sector managerialism, the state has sought 
ever greater cost-effectiveness by tempering demand for justice in the courts. Using Australia 
as an example, this article analyses six processes by which the state has modulated this demand, 
namely, extinguishing, expelling, diverting, incentivising, filtering, and demoting. But at what 
price? Greater efficiencies sometimes come at a cost to other fundamental values, such as access 
to justice, fair process, impartial decision making, just outcomes, and public trust. The article 
evaluates these tensions by examining a suite of specific demand management mechanisms that 
have been widely used in civil and criminal disputes in Australia. 
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Courts play a fundamental role in liberal states in resolving disputes and developing the legal 
fabric that underpins social order. They offer a special kind of dispute resolution—one that 
entails use of a third party (the judge), deciding on the merits (the law), utilising structures and 
processes intended to preserve the authority and impartiality of the institution.1 
Unsurprisingly, judicial process takes time, and with that comes expense for the disputants and 
the state. For the parties, there are the privately borne costs of legal advice, disbursements, time, 
and adverse rulings. For the state, there are the publicly borne costs of judicial remuneration, 
court staff, court houses, libraries, and communication technologies. The public and private 
costs are inflated by the glacial pace of many court proceedings—a pace partially dictated by 
the commitment to procedural fairness and by the need for reasoned decision making as an 
accountability mechanism under the rule of law. 
Commencing earlier, but with quickening tempo from the 1990s, many countries have sought 
greater effectiveness in the delivery of public services, including in the justice sector.2 One 
motivation for reform has been to promote access to justice by removing geographic, economic, 
social, and cultural impediments to meeting legal needs. Good laws are of little value if the 
legal system does not provide a useful method for enforcing them.3 Another motivation has 
been fiscal: governments face insatiable demand for finite public resources and are driven to 
ever greater cost-effectiveness as they seek new ways to keep the wheels of justice turning 
faster, with less friction, and at lower cost. Managerialism, privatising, outsourcing, and 
downsizing have become familiar themes in public sector management discourse. 
A recent expression of this movement in the Australian justice sector is the controversial 
decision to merge the Family Court with the Federal Circuit Court in service to the goal of 
improving the judicial resolution of family law disputes. The Attorney General’s Department 
has claimed that the reforms will ‘improve the efficiency of the family law system; reduce the 
backlog of matters in the family law courts; and drive faster, cheaper and more consistent 
resolution of disputes for Australian families’; and the Attorney General has stated in 
Parliament that the measure will ‘assist families to have their matters dealt with quickly, 
efficiently, cheaply and as safely as possible’.4 These aspirations are reflected in the objects of 
the new Act, one of which is ‘to ensure that justice is delivered by federal courts effectively and 
efficiently’.5 Structural reforms such as these are analysed further below, but they are one of 
many mechanisms used by governments today to advance the goal of cost-effectiveness in 
dispute resolution. 
 
1 Joe McIntyre, The Judicial Function: Fundamental Principles of Contemporary Judging (Springer, 2019) 
33–48. 
2 Donald Kettl, 'The Global Revolution in Public Management: Driving Themes, Missing Links' (1997) 16(3) 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 446. 
3 Frederick Wilmot-Smith, Equal Justice: Fair Legal Systems in an Unfair World (Harvard University Press, 
2019) . 
4 Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, 'Structural Reform of the Federal Courts', (Web 
Page, 2019) <https://www.ag.gov.au/legal-system/publications/structural-reform-federal-courts-overview>; 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 December 2019 (Mr Porter, Attorney 
General) 7054. 
5 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 5. 
3 
This study has two aims. The first is to examine the processes by which the state has sought 
greater cost-effectiveness in the justice system by tempering demand for adjudication in the 
courts.6 Courts often regard themselves as the ‘central suppliers of justice’, yet they are not the 
sole means of resolving disputes in society.7 If an overarching objective of the justice sector is 
to ‘contribute to a safe and secure community and promote a law-abiding way of life’,8 courts 
can be seen as one formal element in a complex system that allows a degree of substitution 
between component parts. Over the past generation, the relative position of the courts within 
the justice sector has been eroded as other mechanisms for resolving disputes have been created 
or enhanced. This study presents a typology of the state’s economising processes and illustrates 
them through practical case studies. 
The second aim is to evaluate these economising processes by reference to the fundamental 
values that underpin the justice system. An evaluation is needed because action that advances 
one state objective (e.g., cost-effectiveness) sometimes exacts a price in terms of other 
objectives. However, the tensions and trade-offs are specific to the problem at hand. The 
evaluation helps to identify where managerialism in the justice sector may be inimical to the 
public good because it fails to find an appropriate balance. 
When analysing the state’s economising processes, this article refers to the conduct of all 
governmental organs through which the state exerts its authority—executive, legislative, and 
judicial. The executive performs a central role in initiating policy in response to (and sometimes 
in the face of) advice given by government departments and independent advisory bodies. The 
implementation of these policies usually requires legislative action, of which many examples 
are canvassed below. The judicial branch has also been a significant player in the process of 
tempering demand for the courts. In one sense this is so because the shortcomings of the judicial 
system—too slow, too expensive, too unresponsive—may encourage disputants to ‘vote with 
their feet’ by seeking alternative ways to resolve disputes. More positively, courts have 
encouraged this movement through a variety of means, including rules of court made under 
delegated legislative power (e.g., allocating litigation costs); the exercise of judicial discretions 
(e.g., granting or refusing leave to appeal); and substantive decisions (e.g., supporting active 
case management).9 This is not to suggest that courts regularly seek to shed their core functions 
of dispute resolution, but they are participants in a complex economising process designed to 
streamline the delivery of justice. 
The central themes are examined through the lens of the Australian judicial system, but the 
phenomena discussed here share common ground with other legal systems in the common law 
tradition. This can be seen, for instance, in the contemporaneity of major inquiries into civil 
justice in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States from the 
late 1990s, and in the similarity of many of their reforms.10 There is a need for comparative 
 
6 Cost-effectiveness measures how well resource inputs (land, labour, capital) are converted into outcomes for 
individuals and the community. This is distinguishable from the concept of technical efficiency, which 
measures how well inputs are converted into service outputs: Productivity Commission, Report on 
Government Services 2021 (2021) Pt A, Sec 1. 
7 Susannah Sage-Jacobson, 'The Ongoing Search for a Demand-Side Analysis of Civil Justice in Australia' in 
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (ed), Australian Courts: Serving Democracy and its Publics 
(Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2013) 49, 53 . 
8 Productivity Commission (n 6) Pt C. 
9 Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 ('Aon Risk Services 
Australia Ltd v Australian National University'). See also discussion in Part V(E). 
10 Trevor Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (University of Toronto Press, 2014) 77-117. 
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research on these questions, but it is not possible to address them within the confines of this 
article. 
Within Australia, the study does not purport to be an exhaustive examination of the federal, 
state, and territorial components of the judicial system. Rather, it draws on representative case 
studies to illustrate broader concepts. The examples are taken from different Australian 
jurisdictions, and from the civil and criminal sides of the justice system, to underscore the point 
that the state’s economising goals are ubiquitous, even if the mechanisms for realising them are 
varied. Moreover, to better understand the integrated nature of the justice sector as a ‘system’, 
the study consciously pursues breadth of coverage, even if this comes at a cost to depth of 
treatment of individual elements. 
While the study focusses on the processes for tempering demand for the courts, there is a 
parallel question of supply, which has been considered elsewhere.11 Governments manage 
judicial labour through new judgeships; appointing acting judges on short-term commissions; 
raising mandatory retirement ages; increasing the use of allied personnel to free judicial officers 
from minor routine work; and enhancing judicial productivity so that more output can be 
achieved with the same input. These strategies are vital to the efficient functioning of the courts, 
but they are not canvassed here. 
The article is organised as follows. Part II substantiates the claim that there has been a turn 
away from Australian courts over the past generation, which is evident in government 
expenditure on the courts and in case lodgements in the courts. Part III presents a typology of 
the processes by which the state has encouraged this movement, which are presented under six 
rubrics: extinguishing, expelling, diverting, incentivising, filtering, and demoting. Part IV 
identifies the fundamental values that are implicated in these processes, including access to 
justice, fairness of process, impartiality of decision making, just outcomes, and public trust in 
the administration of justice. The core of the study is situated in Part V, which explains the 
economising processes and illustrates them with case studies in civil and criminal disputes. 
Part VI concludes by acknowledging the importance of cost-effectiveness in any functional 
system of dispute resolution but advocating for due weight to be given to other fundamental 
values when they collide. 
II. THE TURN FROM THE COURTS 
There has been a turn away from Australian courts over the past generation. It is evident in civil 
and criminal matters but is most pronounced in the former. This phenomenon has also been 
experienced in other common law countries. In the United States, Galanter was an early 
observer of the precipitous decline in the number of trials—federal and state, civil and criminal, 
jury and bench12—and the same has been noted in Canada in specific sectors.13 In England, 
 
11 Shar Diamond and Jessica Bina, 'Puzzles about Supply-Side Explanations for Vanishing Trials: A New Look 
at Fundamentals' (2004) 1(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 637; Brian Opeskin, 'The Supply of Judicial 
Labour: Optimising a Scarce Resource in Australia' (2017) 7(4) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 847. See also Don 
Weatherburn and Jacqueline Fitzgerald, 'Trial Court Delay and the NSW District Criminal Court' (2015) 184 
Crime and Justice Bulletin 1, 3, 7, discussing the impact of court sitting hours on delays in criminal trials. 
12 Marc Galanter, 'The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts' (2004) 1(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 459; Marc Galanter, 'A World Without Trials?' 
[2006](1) Journal of Dispute Resolution 7. 
13 Beverley McLachlin, 'Judging the "Vanishing Trial" in the Construction Industry' (2011) 2(2) Faulkner Law 
Review 315. 
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Genn has remarked on the long-term ‘decline and now virtual extinction of trials in the civil 
courts and with it public determination of the merits of civil disputes’.14 The Australian 
evidence is similar, as can be seen in two corroborating sources of data, namely, government 
expenditure on the courts and case lodgements in the courts. 
A. Government Expenditure on the Courts 
Since 1995, the Productivity Commission has collected data on the effectiveness and efficiency 
of government-funded social services. Its annual Report on Government Services (‘ROGS’) 
contains statistics on recurrent government expenditure on Australian courts across all 
jurisdictions and levels of the court hierarchy. In real terms (in 2019-20 dollars), government 
expenditure on courts rose from $1.4 billion in 1994-95 to $2.2 billion in 2019-20; an increase 
of 56% over 26 years.15 Nearly all that growth occurred during the first half of that period, 
followed by stagnation over the succeeding 10 years and a small uptick in the most recent years. 
This is shown in Figure 1 (solid line), in which comparison is made between several indices, 
using 1994-95 as the base year. The change in government expenditure on courts is in line with 
population growth of 42% over the same period (dotted line), such that per capita expenditure 
on courts has barely shifted over a generation. This would be unremarkable but for the fact that 
real government expenditure on all sectors rose by 129% over the same period (dashed line). 
This signals a significant retreat in expenditure on the courts relative to all areas of government 
activity (of which the largest components have been welfare, health, education, and defence). 
 
14 Hazel Genn, 'Why the Privatisation of Civil Justice is a Rule of Law Issue' (Speech, FA Mann Lecture, 19 
November 2012) 1. 
15 The data used here are recurrent government expenditure on courts (including payroll tax), net of income 
generated by court fees and fines, converted to constant 2020 dollars using the General Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure (GGFCE) chain price deflator. 
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Figure 1: Real Government Expenditure and Population, Australia, 1994-95 to 2019-20 
 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, National, State and Territory Population, Sep 2020 (2021); 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, 
Dec 2020 (2021); Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2021 (2021) and cognate 
years. 
 
A more nuanced understanding can be obtained by disaggregating government expenditure on 
courts into civil and criminal components. Figure 2 shows that real expenditure is characterised 
by two distinct periods. From 1994-95 to 2006-07 both civil expenditure (dashed line) and 
criminal expenditure (dotted line) rose, the former at a much faster rate. However, from 2006-
07 to 2016-17 there was an absolute decline in real government expenditure on civil courts 
(followed by a recent uptick); while real expenditure on criminal courts has continued to rise at 
a similar rate to the earlier period. The stagnation in real expenditure on all courts (solid line) 
for the decade 2006-07 to 2016-17 is the net effect of these countervailing forces. Genn’s 
observation about the decline of civil justice in the United Kingdom thus has its counterpart in 
Australia.16 
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Sources: Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2021 (2021) and cognate years. 
 
B. Declining Lodgements in the Courts 
A supplementary means of evaluating demand for adjudication is to examine the number of 
matters commenced in Australian courts. Some small-scale studies have done this for individual 
courts,17 but it is more instructive to take a national perspective using annual data on court 
‘lodgements’ published by the Productivity Commission.18 This may be viewed as a proxy for 
court demand, although it adopts a court-centric view of what constitutes a legal ‘case’ in 
circumstances where sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and political scientists have 
differing conceptions about the relevant unit of analysis.19 
Figure 3 charts the number of civil and criminal lodgements, using indices in which 1999-2000 
is the base year.20 In that year, there were 1.76 million lodgements (53% civil and 47% 
criminal). By 2019-20 this had fallen to 1.42 million lodgements (46% civil and 54% 
criminal)—a reduction of some 335,000 cases annually. The number of criminal lodgements 
(dotted line) shows cyclical fluctuations, but the overall trend is one of stability—in 2019-20 
there were just 7% fewer lodgements than 20 years earlier. By contrast, the decline in civil 
 
17 David Spencer, 'The Decline of the Trial in Australia' (2011) 30(2) The Arbitrator and Mediator 1, examining 
the District Court of New South Wales, 1990–2009. 
18 Productivity Commission (n 6) Tables 7A.1, 7A.2, and cognate years. 
19 Patrick Peel, 'Renewing the Longitudinal Study of Trial Courts' (2017) 38(3) Justice System Journal 290; 
Sage-Jacobson (n 7). 
20 This base differs from the one used above for government expenditure to remove the distorting effect of 
ROGS’ former practice of including electronic fines as lodgements in the magistrates’ courts. 
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lodgements (dashed line) has been strong and persistent, with a 30% reduction over the same 
period. 
Figure 3: Court Lodgements and Population, Australia, 1999-2000 to 2019-20 
 
 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, National, State and Territory Population, Sep 2020 (2021); 
Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2021 (2021) and cognate years. 
 
These changes have taken place against the backdrop of a population that has been rising 
steadily (solid line). Population growth affects the volume and patterns of human activity in a 
community. It is self-evident that a jurisdiction of 1,000,000 people will experience a greater 
volume of crime than one of 100,000, all else being equal, simply because it has ten times the 
number of potential offenders and victims.21 The same is true of civil disputes because 
additional population engenders more commerce, more relationships, and more interactions 
with the potential for disputation. These size effects have repercussions for the judicial system. 
One would expect them to be manifested in greater demand for adjudication as population 
grows over time, such that demand per capita remains roughly stable. The fact that this is not 
the case highlights the dramatic decline in demand. In criminal matters, the 7% fall in 
lodgements, set against the 34% increase in population, has resulted in a 31% decline in 
lodgements per capita. In civil matters, the 30% fall in lodgements, set against the 34% increase 
in population, has resulted in a 47% decline in lodgements per capita. The latter point is 
illustrated in Figure 3 by the index of civil lodgements per capita (solid line with marker). 
In summary, there has been a precipitous decline in civil matters commenced in Australian 
courts over the past 20 years, both in absolute terms and per capita; while in criminal matters 
demand has been steady in absolute terms but has still declined significantly per capita. For 
 
21 Mitchell Chamlin and John Cochran, 'An Excursus on the Population Size-Crime Relationship' (2004) 5(2) 
Western Criminology Review 119. 
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reasons that will be interrogated below, Australian courts today do not play the same empirical 
role they did a generation ago. 
III. SIX PROCESSES FOR TEMPERING DEMAND 
The turn from the courts has not been the product of chance. It is principally the result of 
concerted action by the state to make justice more cost-effective by confining courts to a 
narrower adjudicatory domain, while providing alternative pathways to quell disputes. These 
measures have been adopted sporadically over time and space, but hindsight allows them to be 
drawn together as a purposeful ‘solution’ that puts a price on justice, often at a cost to other 
system values.  
Six processes by which the state curbs demand for the courts are as follows: 
1. Extinguishing—existing rights or duties are abrogated so that no legal dispute can arise 
between individuals, or between individuals and the state. 
2. Expelling—legal disputes are shunted from the state-sponsored system of civil or 
criminal justice, for resolution in the private sphere. 
3. Diverting—legal disputes are retained within the state’s justice system but rechannelled 
for resolution by processes that lie beyond the courts. 
4. Incentivising—rewards and punishments are used to influence the behaviour of 
disputants in deciding what use to make of the state’s judicial system. 
5. Filtering—legal disputes are screened so that ‘unmeritorious’ disputes do not reach the 
courts at all, or do not progress further in the courts than is necessary. 
6. Demoting—legal disputes are resolved by the courts but are pushed down to the lowest 
and most economical tier at which they can be satisfactorily adjudicated. 
Schematic representations of these pressure points for state intervention are shown in Figure 4 
for civil matters and Figure 5 for criminal matters. Human activity gives rise to disputes (some 
legal, some non-legal), which percolate through various channels according to the restrictions 
placed in their path. The judicial system is represented by the right-most of three panels, sitting 
within the larger system of civil or criminal justice. Some disputes never reach the judicial 
system because legal rights or obligations are extinguished, or redirected to the private sphere, 
or channelled to parts of the justice system beyond the courts. Matters that can be resolved by 
the courts are also subject to restrictions. The modulating processes are marked in the diagram 
at the point at which they impinge on the operation of the system. 
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Figure 5: Tempering Processes in Criminal Matters 
 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The goal of cost-effectiveness, to which the economising processes are directed, is not the sole, 
nor arguably the most important, value of a system of justice. Pursuing this goal may generate 
tensions with other important values. These cannot be entirely avoided but a mature legal 
system seeks an appropriate accommodation between competing values when they clash. 
Understanding the interrelationship between fundamental values requires a distinction to be 
drawn between rules, principles, and values, which is best explained by example. In Australia, 
there is a constitutional rule that no judge may serve in federal judicial office beyond the age 
of 70 years.22 Other jurisdictions have different rules on that topic—in Tasmania and the 
Northern Territory the age limit is 72 years, and in New South Wales it is 75 years.23 Despite 
the differences, these rules all stand in service to a higher principle, namely, that judges should 
be subject to mandatory retirement at a fixed age to avoid the costs of overstaying, such as 
 
22 Australian Constitution s 72. 
23 See e.g. Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 6A; Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) s 38; Judicial Officers Act 1986 
(NSW) s 44. 
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mental decrepitude in office.24 Yet that goal might also be achieved by different institutional 
arrangements, such as judicial terms of fixed duration (e.g., the 12-year non-renewable term of 
judges of the German Constitutional Court). If we abstract to a still-higher plane, the principle 
of mandatory retirement at a fixed age (like the alternative of fixed terms) stands in service to 
the higher value of quality decision making that delivers just outcomes to the parties according 
to law. The distinction between rules, principles, and values associated with judicial tenure is 
not merely about their degree of detail but about identifying the ultimate justifications that 
specific rules are designed to serve.25 
The values that underpin the justice system have been extensively discussed, especially in the 
context of civil justice. Despite differences in nomenclature and classification, there is 
substantial accord about some elements and discord about others. Some of the key conceptual 
contributions to the debate have been canvassed by Olijnyk and do not need repetition here.26 
In the context of civil matters, Andrews has identified four cornerstones of the civil justice 
system, which he lists as access to justice; fairness of process; speed and effectiveness; and just 
outcomes; with each value harbouring a cluster of lower-order tenets.27 Shetreet has proposed 
a five-point typology, which overlaps with Andrews’ list in many respects but differs in 
others.28 Shetreet’s values comprise fairness of the adjudication process; efficiency of the 
justice system; access to justice; public confidence in the courts; and independence of the 
judiciary. 
In finding common ground between these accounts (and with some modifications of language), 
this study proceeds on the basis that a system of justice should strive to respect the following 
values: 
1. Access to justice—the extent to which those who seek to enforce their rights can use the 
legal system to obtain an outcome by fair and open process.29 
2. Procedural fairness—processes and practices that give disputants a genuine voice, with 
respectful treatment, through institutions that demonstrate an ethic of benevolence 
(reflecting research indicating that litigants consistently value fairness of process above 
fairness of outcome).30 
3. Impartiality—decision making that treats all parties fairly, and free from bias, prejudice, 
or preference (to the extent humanly possible).31 
 
24 Brian Opeskin, 'Models of Judicial Tenure: Reconsidering Life Limits, Age Limits and Term Limits for 
Judges' (2015) 35(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 627. 
25 Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer (Harvard University Press, 2009) 13–35. 
26 Anna Olijnyk, Justice and Efficiency in Mega-Litigation (Hart Publishing, 2019) 51-73. 
27 Neil Andrews, 'Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure: Order Out of Chaos' in Xandra Kramer and C 
van Rhee (eds), Civil Litigation in a Globalising World (TMC Asser Press, 2012) 19. 
28 Shimon Shetreet, 'Fundamental Values of the Justice System' (2012) 23(1) European Business Law Review 
61. 
29 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Access to Justice: Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings 
(Consultation Paper, 2017) 2. 
30 Kevin Burke and Steve Leben, 'Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction' (2007) 44(1-2) 
Court Review 4. 
31 The importance of impartiality dates to antiquity: Socrates described the four responsibilities of a judge as 
‘to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially’. See Charles Geyh, 
'The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality' (2014) 65(2) Florida Law Review 493, 498. 
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4. Just outcomes according to law—outcomes based on the merits of the case (rather than 
according to chance or might), where merit is assessed by legal standards.32 
5. Public trust in the administration of justice—made necessary because the efficacy of 
the courts (as the ‘weakest branch of government’)33 depends on the continuing 
acceptance of their authority by the community.34 
6. Cost-effectiveness—how well the justice system converts resource inputs into outcomes 
for individuals and the community. 
The relationships between these values are complex. This article frequently raises the question 
whether there is an agonistic relationship between cost-effectiveness and other system values. 
Similarly, Olijnyk has suggested, in the context of mega-litigation, that value tensions are 
inherent in large civil actions.35 Giving parties A and B the fullest opportunity to present their 
case, without regard to the court resources that consumes, may well promote those parties’ 
access to justice. But it might also mean that litigants C and D face a longer wait for their day 
in court; while plaintiffs E and F may decide that court delays are now so great it is not worth 
litigating at all. These frictions were pithily summarised in a South Australian case many years 
ago when King CJ remarked that ‘a party is entitled to his day in court but not to someone else’s 
day in court’.36 
However, fundamental values of the justice system do not always work in opposition to each 
other—sometimes they are mutually supportive. For instance, procedural fairness and just 
outcomes according to law both bolster public trust in the administration of justice. Likewise, 
greater cost-effectiveness, though quicker and cheaper dispute resolution, may promote access 
to justice, as the Attorney-General argued when justifying the 2021 merger of the Family Court 
and the Federal Circuit Court.37 It is not possible to examine every dyadic relationship between 
values here. Rather, this article seeks to illuminate key tensions, and occasional harmonies, 
between fundamental values when the state takes action to curb demand for the courts. 
V. CASE STUDIES ON THE ECONOMISING PROCESSES 
This Part explains the state’s six economising processes in greater detail and proffers case 
studies to illustrate their operation in practical contexts. The case studies are taken from 
different Australian jurisdictions and span both civil and criminal matters. 
A. Extinguishing 
Courts provide an institutional mechanism for resolving disputes according to law. It follows 
that the legal rules assigning liability for conduct ultimately determine the availability of court 
action. These rules expand and contract with legislative intervention and changing perceptions 
 
32 McIntyre (n 1) 44-5. 
33 Alexander Hamilton, 'The Federalist No 78' in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison (eds), The 
Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (Modern Library, 1964 ed, 1788) 502. 
34 Susan Kenny, 'Maintaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Precarious Equilibrium' (1999) 25 Monash 
University Law Review 209, 210. 
35 Olijnyk (n 26) 12. 
36 United Motors Retail Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd (1991) 58 SASR 156 ('United Motors 
Retail Ltd v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd') 158. 
37 See Part I above. 
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of the judicial function.38 Historical examples of expansion include the rise of negligence law, 
civil rights, and the flourishing of judicial review of administrative action. To take a 
comparative illustration, in the United States the unbridled growth of law (‘hyperlexis’) has 
been credited as a cause of the ‘litigation explosion’ that was observed the 1960s and 1970s.39 
Conversely, legislation may abrogate legal rights or extinguish obligations, and thus deny the 
basis on which disputants can seek redress in the courts. The examples of contraction discussed 
below are the abolition of common law rights to compensation for personal injuries in the civil 
sphere,40 and the decriminalisation of certain conduct in the criminal sphere. 
1. Abrogating Rights to Compensation for Personal Injuries 
Civil liability offers a prime example of the state’s ability to constrain demand for litigation by 
extinguishing rights. New Zealand demonstrated the highwater mark of this approach in the 
1970s when it abolished large swathes of tort law and replaced it with a statutory right to 
compensation for accidental injuries, regardless of fault.41 Long before, Australia had enacted 
a modest version of such a scheme for workplace injuries, where there is still a statutory no-
fault system of compensation, funded by employers’ insurance premiums, in lieu of a common 
law action for damages.42 
More recently, beyond the field of workers’ compensation, there have been other tort law 
reforms relevant to the process of extinguishment. In 2002, a national review panel was 
constituted ‘to examine a method for the reform of the common law with the objective of 
limiting liability and quantum of damages arising from personal injury and death’. The review 
was prompted by a so-called ‘insurance crisis’ resulting from burgeoning levels of 
compensation for personal injury.43 The resulting Ipp Report became the impetus for 
nationwide reforms covering civil liability, quantum of damages, and procedure.44 Although 
the reforms did not adopt the radical approach of workers’ compensation legislation, they had 
the practical effect of extinguishing previously valid claims at common law. They did so by 
adjusting the rules of civil liability—tightening the limitation period, reducing the standard of 
care, narrowing the scope of the duty of care, broadening defences such as assumption of risk, 
and excluding damages in cases below a minimum threshold. 
 
38 Paul Finn, 'Preface' in Paul Finn (ed), Essays on Torts (Law Book Company, 1989) v. 
39 Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) 
about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society' (1983) 31(1) UCLA Law Review 4. See also Gerhard 
Casper and Richard Posner, 'A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload' (1974) 3(2) Journal of Legal Studies 
339, postulating that new or expanded legal rights have contributed to the growth in caseload of the United 
States Supreme Court. 
40 A further civil example is the government’s attempts to abrogate rights of judicial review of migration 
decisions in its quest to control Australia’s borders. Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Judicial Review of Migration 
Decisions: Life after S157' (2005) 33(1) Federal Law Review 141; Mary Crock, 'Judging Refugees: The 
Clash of Power and Institutions in the Development of Australian Refugee Law' (2004) 26(1) Sydney Law 
Review 51. 
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The impact of these changes on demand for courts in civil matters was stark. Wright examined 
personal injury litigation before and after the Ipp Report and found there was a dramatic decline 
in litigation.45 Leaving aside the spate in filings lodged in anticipation of the restrictions taking 
effect, the rate of filing declined from an average of 4.5 claims per 10,000 population in 1996–
2001 to just 1.7–1.8 claims per 10,000 in 2004 and 2005—a 60% decline in claiming rates. 
Wright concluded that ‘large numbers of people who are injured through the fault of others, and 
would once have had substantial claims, no longer seek compensation’.46 
The reduction in civil litigation through extinguishment comes, however, at a cost to other 
fundamental values of the justice system. Specifically, it negatively affects access to justice 
because aggrieved persons who suffer injury or loss are no longer able to obtain a remedy at 
law, and it may deleteriously affect public perceptions of the administration of justice in so far 
as injured parties are left to bear the burden of loss caused by the fault of others. 
2. Decriminalising Conduct 
The criminal law prohibits a broad range of conduct of varying seriousness, from murder to 
flying a kite to the annoyance of others.47 The types of conduct that attract the opprobrium of 
criminal sanction have evolved over time because of additions to, and subtractions from, the 
corpus of criminal law. The question that arises here is the extent to which the subtractions (i.e., 
decriminalisation) have been motivated by the state’s desire to dampen demand for the criminal 
courts. In Australia, steps have been taken over past decades to decriminalise public 
drunkenness, vagrancy, sex work, abortion, homosexuality, and possession of cannabis. In most 
cases, the motivations for change have been shifting social mores, new approaches to regulating 
social problems, and expanding conceptions of human rights. 
Nonetheless, the economising effects of decriminalisation have not been far from consideration. 
Reforms to public drunkenness in the 1990s, for instance, overtly sought to reduce the number 
of cases heard by the lower courts, and lessen the amount of police time devoted to dealing with 
persons apprehended for drunkenness.48 Moreover, the number of pardons recently granted to 
men for historical convictions for homosexual offences indicates the scale of state resources 
that have been expended on such matters in the past—in the United Kingdom alone, 50,000–
100,000 pardons have been granted since 2017 under the so-called ‘Turing law’.49 
These instances of decriminalisation have had only a modest impact at a systems level because 
there have been countervailing forces—the expansion of the regulatory state and the growth of 
social punitiveness have vastly increased the number and variety of criminal offences regulating 
human conduct in complex societies.50 Writing of the United States, but in terms relevant to 
Australia, Husak has noted the expansion of criminalisation in contemporary society through 
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the creation of offences that often lack the moral culpability traditionally associated with 
notions of crime (kite-flying being a case in point).51 
This account suggests that decriminalisation can occur in very different contexts. Where it 
legalises conduct that was once regarded as immoral (drunkenness, sex work, homosexuality 
etc), it poses few risks for other values of the justice system because it simply removes 
individuals from that system. Perhaps the only adverse effect in such cases is on public trust in 
the administration of justice among people who believe the newly legalised conduct remains 
immoral. 
B. Expelling 
Besides extinguishing rights and obligations, the state curbs demand for the courts by shunting 
some legal disputes beyond the state-sponsored justice system, for resolution in the private 
domain—a process here called expulsion. This is a radical option because the state loses control 
of the process, while still having an interest in the fair resolution of disputes as a means of 
maintaining social order. Private resolution also runs a risk of lessening fidelity to ‘the law’ as 
the merit-base on which a dispute is resolved. Genn, for instance, notes that ‘official pressure 
to divert civil disputes to private dispute resolution’ in the United Kingdom locates civil justice 
as a private matter and diminishes its public function in serving the rule of law.52 But this can 
also be an attraction for the parties because it allows disputants to find a mutually acceptable 
solution ‘in the shadow of the law’, freed from the formal constraints of domestic legal doctrine 
and procedure.53 It must also be acknowledged that private resolution may represent not only a 
push outward by the state from the justice system but a pull inward by private institutions 
seeking dispute resolution business for commercial gain. 
Expulsion is more common in civil than in criminal matters because in civil disputes the 
interests at stake are usually pecuniary, thus allowing more opportunity for private 
accommodation. In criminal matters, disputes are between the individual and the state, in which 
the Crown seeks vindication of a public interest by punishing breaches of social order. It is not 
easy to do this outside state organs. The examples chosen to illustrate ‘expulsion’ in these very 
different contexts are alternative dispute resolution in civil disputes and disciplining the 
perpetrators of violence in sport via sporting bodies, in lieu of pursuing them through the 
criminal courts. 
1. Alternative Resolution of Civil Disputes 
The alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) movement originated in the United States in the 
1960s and was transplanted to Australia in the 1970s and 1980s. It has been hailed as an 
informal, non-adversarial substitute for court proceedings, but in truth ADR is an umbrella term 
that covers a continuum of civil dispute resolution practices. These range from facilitative 
processes (where an ADR practitioner assists the parties to resolve their own dispute, e.g., 
 
51 Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) . See 
also William Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Harvard University Press, 2011) ch 9. 
52 Hazel Genn, 'What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice' (2012) 24(1) Yale Journal of 
Law & the Humanities 397, 398. In the United States, see also Judith Resnik, 'Diffusing Disputes: The Public 
in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights' (2015) 124(8) Yale Law Journal 
2804. 
53 Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce' (1979) 
88(5) Yale Law Journal 950. 
17 
negotiation or mediation); to advisory processes (where a practitioner advises the parties on the 
facts, law, and possible outcomes, e.g., conciliation); to determinative processes (where a 
practitioner hears evidence and makes a decision on the outcome, e.g., arbitration).54 The last 
of these bears many of the hallmarks of adjudication in the courts, albeit with a private 
arbitrator, rather than a judge, as decision maker. 
ADR offers benefits for the judicial system by relieving the courts of some of their civil 
caseload. It has been said that one of the principal responses of the judiciary to the ‘tidal wave’ 
of litigation has been to seize on ADR ‘as the veritable tabula in naufragio’ (plank in the 
shipwreck).55 For the parties themselves, there are other motivations for preferring ADR over 
litigation. These include the potential for lower cost; quicker resolution; confidentiality; 
creative ‘win-win’ solutions that could not be sanctioned by the courts; determination of 
outcomes by consent; and preservation of personal or commercial relationships beyond the 
dispute.56 Fuelled by these benefits, ADR has seen a robust growth in Australia in the past 
30 years.57 ADR programmes can be found in the community sector and in specific industries 
to resolve disputes between consumers and businesses through industry-funded bodies (e.g., 
telecommunications, financial services). They can also be found within the civil justice system 
in tribunals and courts, which are mentioned under the rubric of diversion in Part V(C) below. 
Beyond its economising benefits, ADR poses challenges for other fundamental values. The 
private nature of the dispute resolution means that fair process cannot be assured. Some argue 
it entrenches existing inequalities of bargaining power between the parties, with consent often 
being coerced—‘the civil analogue of plea bargaining’.58 Moreover, private resolution obscures 
the outcome from public scrutiny and may detract from a just outcome according to the legal 
merits of the case. The law may supply little more than a framework for discussion rather than 
an objective yardstick for fair determination of the outcome. 
2. Punishing Violence in Sport 
Contact sports, and more so combat sports, involve the use of force that would breach the 
criminal law if undertaken in other circumstances, yet the criminal law of assault is rarely 
invoked in a sporting context. Punishments for breaching the ‘rules of the game’ are generally 
meted out, if at all, through disciplinary action taken by the relevant sporting body rather than 
by the courts. This has led to a perception that ‘the sports field is an arena of private conflict, 
in which the criminal law has no jurisdiction’.59 Potential breaches of the criminal law are thus 
expelled from the state-sponsored justice system, to be dealt with elsewhere. 
This privatisation of criminal law has been possible because of two kinds of state action. First, 
police are reluctant to lay charges against sports players because aggression is normalised in 
Australian sporting culture, and those seeking to enforce the criminal law are seen as 
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unwelcome prowlers.60 Police regard discipline for violent behaviour in sport as a matter 
internal to the sporting code, and they are unlikely to investigate, at least where private 
regulation of the sport is robust.61 The same disinclination infects prosecuting authorities. 
Secondly, the courts too have been reluctant to intervene, with several influential decisions of 
the English courts in the late 19th century carving out an ill-defined sports exemption to the 
criminal law.62 The judiciary has held that sporting participants are presumed to consent to 
physical contact that accords with the rules and culture of the game, and even to some foul play. 
The courts have stepped in only where the violent acts are so egregious that the law does not 
allow a victim to consent to them, such as where there is an intention to cause serious injury or 
death. For the most part, courts have bowed to the convenience of private regulation, stating 
that ‘in the majority of situations there is not only no need for criminal proceedings, it is 
undesirable that there should be any criminal proceedings’.63 
The bypassing of criminal law in favour of self-regulation has been hotly debated in sport. 
Much depends on the arrangements put in place for specific sports.64 Australia has taken self-
regulation to a high point in the arrangements adopted by the National Rugby League (‘NRL’) 
and some other sporting codes. There, a private domestic tribunal has been established to deliver 
a highly formalised system of ‘sports justice’, utilising an NRL ‘judiciary’ as a simulacrum of 
the state’s judicial system. In that arrangement, there are few conflicts with fundamental values 
of the justice system because self-regulation has mirrored the values of the state’s criminal 
justice system. The exception is the achievement of just outcomes according to law, since sports 
bodies apply the internal rules of their code, not the criminal law. The robustness of the NRL 
arrangements supports the attitude of the criminal justice system in allowing the sport to police 
itself, but it has not saved the state’s judiciary much work because few cases of injurious 
conduct in sport rise to the level of criminality. Other sports, with less formalised systems for 
punishing violence, may raise greater concerns. 
C. Diverting 
The object of diversion is to keep disputes outside the judicial system, while nevertheless 
retaining them within the state-sponsored justice system. This differs from the process of 
expulsion, where dispute resolution is relegated to the private sphere. In this section, civil 
diversion is illustrated by the role of state tribunals, with their less-formal procedures overseen 
by ‘members’ who perform quasi-judicial functions. Criminal diversion is illustrated by the 
way minor criminality, such as traffic infringement, has been almost entirely removed from the 
courts and transferred to administrative machinery within the state bureaucracy. Similar 
phenomena have been observed in other jurisdictions, with Galanter describing the process in 
the United States as one of ‘displacement’ of adjudicatory functions to the periphery.65 
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The use of diversion to attenuate demand for the courts has proliferated in recent decades. Other 
instances of civil diversion are the mandatory use of ADR in civil litigation (arising from pre-
filing obligations or referral by a judge during the proceedings);66 and the expanding scope of 
independent but state-funded ombudsmen to resolve disputes between individuals and 
government.67 Other instances of criminal diversion include: police warnings and cautions 
before charges are laid; education and treatment programmes; restorative justice and therapeutic 
jurisprudence programmes;68 and systems of military justice and parliamentary discipline. Each 
mechanism brings its own challenges to the core values of the justice system, as illustrated in 
the examples below. 
1. Tribunalisation 
Across Australia there are robust tribunal systems that serve as alternative venues for legal 
decision making in a wide variety of civil and administrative matters.69 For over thirty years, 
there has been a steady haemorrhaging of civil jurisdiction away from the courts towards these 
bodies, in a process described as tribunalisation.70 Historically, there were hundreds of 
specialised civil tribunals, but today their jurisdiction has been substantially centralised in 
‘super tribunals’, which may be found in every state and territory (bar Tasmania) and at the 
federal level. The number of matters heard in these tribunals is substantial. In 2018-19, some 
260,818 matters were lodged in the super tribunals, which is 42 per cent of the 622,849 civil 
matters lodged in corresponding federal, state, and territory courts in the same period.71 
The importance of tribunals in managing the demand for courts arises from the potential overlap 
in the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals. There is no strict separation of powers at the state 
level so that, if the legislature so authorises, a state tribunal may exercise state judicial power 
that could otherwise have been conferred on a state court.72 This can be done by conferring 
concurrent jurisdiction on courts and tribunals, while imposing cost-disincentives for 
proceedings in the courts (see Part V(D)); or more radically by conferring exclusive jurisdiction 
on the tribunal. This situation has incurred the ire of some judges who see this as creating 
undesirable competition between courts and tribunals for jurisdiction, power, and resources.73 
At the federal level, by contrast, there is a strict constitutional demarcation between the exercise 
of judicial and non-judicial power.74 This has had the effect of halting the proliferation of 
federal tribunals and encouraging the creation of a lower tier federal court as an alternative 
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avenue for the resolution of smaller civil disputes (see Part V(F)). Nonetheless, the synergy 
between federal courts and federal tribunals can be seen in their overlapping membership (many 
federal judges serve as judicial members of the tribunals), and in the operational support given 
by the Federal Court to tribunals in the fields of competition law, copyright, defence force 
discipline, and native title. 
The advantages of proceeding in a tribunal rather than a court include cost, speed, 
specialisation, and informality—but in an institutional setting that respects many fair process 
values developed in the courts.75 Yet these benefits do not make tribunalisation an unequivocal 
blessing. Tribunal members typically lack the protection of full judicial independence, making 
them more politically vulnerable than judicial officers. This danger was demonstrated in 2018 
when the Australian Government broke with a settled practice of apolitical merits-based 
appointments by selecting a suite of conservatively aligned individuals (including former 
parliamentarians) to sit as members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.76 The tendency to 
deprive courts of jurisdiction in favour of bodies that lack judicial independence thus weakens 
the rule of law and may compromise the values of impartiality of decision making and public 
trust in the administration of justice.77 
2. Criminal Infringement Notice Systems 
Many minor infractions of the criminal law are no longer dealt with in the courts but through 
the wheels of state bureaucracy—leading to ‘technocratic justice’ that has been said to ‘denude 
the criminal law of its moral content’.78 The foundations were laid in the 1950s when fines were 
introduced for breaches of road traffic legislation. Over time, criminal infringement notice 
(‘CIN’) systems have expanded widely to ‘address the effect of minor law breaking with 
minimum recourse to the machinery of the formal justice system’.79 
The essence of a CIN system is that an alleged offender is invited to expiate his or her liability 
for an offence by payment of a penalty. The penalty is imposed by an administrative (often 
automated) process and is fixed in advance by the legislature without regard to the individual 
circumstances of the offence or the offender. The punishment is typically a monetary penalty, 
but it may be supplemented by other sanctions such as driver’s licence demerit points or licence 
suspension. Their expediency benefits the state, as much as the citizen, because the state ‘gains 
a stream of low-cost penal revenue without overwhelming its courts with routine cases’.80 
The use of CIN systems has grown exponentially due to the increasing number of agencies 
authorised to issue infringement notices, the increasing number of offences for which they may 
be issued, and technological innovations (e.g., traffic cameras) that allow more offences to be 
detected. In just one state, Victoria, as many as 125 agencies (in government, local council, 
education, health, and industry) are authorised to issue infringement notices with respect to 
 
75 JRS Forbes, Justice in Tribunals (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2019) . 
76 Mike Seccombe, 'Political Stacking Leaves Appeals Tribunal in Chaos', The Saturday Paper (Melbourne, 
online, No 232, 24-30 November). 
77 Enid Campbell and HP Lee, The Australian Judiciary (Cambridge University Press, 2001) . 
78 Pat O'Malley, 'Technocratic Justice in Australia' (1984) 2 Law in Context 31, 45. 
79 Gaye Lansdell et al, 'Infringement Systems in Australia: A Precarious Blurring of Civil and Criminal 
Sanctions' (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law Journal 41, 41. 
80 Richard Fox, Criminal Justice On The Spot: Infringement Penalties in Victoria (Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 1995) 1. 
21 
3,261 offences under 50 statutes.81 In 2016–17, those agencies issued 5.4 million infringement 
notices (to a population of 6.3 million residents). Only 1.4 per cent of notices were contested 
by the recipient in the courts.82 
These statistics suggest that CIN systems have alleviated the lowest criminal courts of much 
drudgery. Yet the economising benefits come at a cost to fundamental system values and 
question the quality of justice dispensed in the name of the state. In theory, access to justice is 
preserved because an alleged offender can elect to challenge an infringement notice in court. 
But there is substantial evidence that CIN systems operate harshly in relation to the least 
advantaged people in society, challenging the notion that access to justice is safeguarded.83 
Systems of technocratic justice also test the value of just outcomes according to legal merits 
because of the twin risks that innocent people will settle claims by paying a modest penalty as 
a matter of convenience, and that penalties will be imposed without due regard to factual 
circumstances. If a CIN system is seen to be driven by fiscal rather than correctional objectives, 
it can also threaten public trust in the administration of justice. 
D. Incentivising 
The process of diversion considered above covers a range of circumstances in which the state 
mandates that disputes are to be resolved beyond the courts. There are other situations in which 
the state gives disputants the freedom to choose the courts but seeks to influence that choice 
through a suite of incentives and disincentives. The examples used to illustrate this are, in civil 
cases, the rules regulating the allocation of legal costs in litigation and, in criminal cases, the 
role of plea bargaining. The former imposes financial disincentives on a party who pursues an 
unmeritorious civil claim or defence; the later imposes carceral disincentives on an accused 
who declines to plead guilty and who therefore puts the state to the expense of a trial. 
1. Allocating Litigation Costs in Civil Cases 
Civil litigation imposes substantial private costs on disputants; costs comprised 
overwhelmingly of the bills payable to each party’s legal advisers.84 The expectation of high 
legal costs is a major impediment to initiating litigation, especially where the costs are 
disproportionate to the value at stake. In long-running cases, legal costs can subsume the entire 
value of what is in dispute, as memorialised in the fictitious case of Jarndyce v Jarndyce in 
Charles Dickens’ Bleak House. 
The parties’ expectations of costs are interwoven with the rules governing the allocation of 
private litigation costs upon winning or losing the case. These rules need to strike a balance 
between competing objectives—on the one hand, the cost-effectiveness of deterring worthless 
litigation; and on the other, promoting access to justice to redress legitimate grievances. The 
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balance is achieved through rules for determining who pays and how much they pay,85 but it is 
a dynamic environment that has seen many changes in recent years.86 
As to who pays, Australian law generally follows the English rule of ‘loser pays’, although 
there are discrete areas (e.g., family law) where the ‘American rule’ prevails and each party 
bears their own costs.87 As to how much they pay, there are several variations—costs may be 
recovered from the losing party on a full indemnity basis, on a taxed basis (limited to prescribed 
fee schedules), or on a fixed cost basis set by the court in advance. 
Many of the costs rules purposefully disincentivise litigant behaviour that is inimical to the 
effective operation of the judicial system. First, the loser pays rule instils in the parties the 
‘sober realisation of the potential financial expense involved’.88 The rule creates a financial 
deterrent to commencing unmeritorious litigation because it increases the expected cost of 
losing (the loser gets no damages and pays two sets of legal fees) and thus acts to protect the 
scarce resources of the publicly funded court system.89 Secondly, the courts have guarded the 
judicial system from abuse of process by using their inherent powers to award costs against 
parties who waste the courts’ time, although the success of their efforts has been questioned.90 
Thirdly, Australia has so far rejected damages-based billing, whereby a lawyer receives an 
agreed percentage of the damages awarded to a successful client. This kind of contingency fee 
is considered too encouraging of entrepreneurial litigation, although ‘no win no fee’ funding 
arrangements are permitted.91 
The balancing point between cost-effectiveness and access to justice is not easy to calibrate. In 
a thoughtful report, the Australian Law Reform Commission many years ago emphasised the 
role of costs orders in enforcing the courts’ control of the litigation process and encouraging 
early settlement.92 It recommended reforms to allow courts to award costs against parties who 
cause unnecessary delays or unreasonably pursue issues on which they fail, or who bring 
proceedings vexatiously. However, the report gained little traction and most of its 
recommendations remain unimplemented. Even if primacy were given to the cost-effectiveness 
values of the judicial system, comfort may be taken from the fact that costs allocation rules 
rarely generate conflict with fundamental values of the judicial system (other than access to 
justice discussed above). This is because the power to award costs must be exercised judicially, 
with all that this entails in terms of fair process, impartiality, and just outcomes according to 
law. 
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2. Plea Bargaining in Criminal Cases 
In criminal matters, litigation cost rules are an inadequate means of tempering demand for the 
courts because cost-shifting is highly restricted. Nevertheless, economy is achieved through the 
incentivising practice of plea bargaining, which has long been prevalent in the United States 
and has gradually diffused globally.93 A plea bargain is an agreement between a criminal 
defendant and a prosecutor whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a specific charge in exchange 
for some prosecutorial concession. The concession might be a less serious charge (charge 
bargaining), fewer counts of the same charge (count bargaining), a lesser sentence (sentence 
bargaining), or agreement as to facts that may be relevant to sentencing (fact bargaining).94 
In whichever guise, plea bargaining is a ‘response to capacity overload in the criminal justice 
system’,95 yet its merits are hotly contested.96 Its adherents note the avoidance of lengthy 
criminal trials, with the consequent preservation of judicial resources; and the prospect of a 
more favourable outcome for the accused. Its detractors point to the perversion of justice that 
can arise from the incentive structure, including encouraging innocent persons to plead guilty, 
and subjecting persons to a known but discounted sanction where there is insufficient evidence 
to secure a conviction at trial. In an analysis by a legal historian, Langbein analogised plea 
bargaining to medieval torture in Europe, both of which use coercion to obtain confessions of 
guilt and achieve ‘condemnation without adjudication’.97 Yet the rhetorical force of the analogy 
overlooks the fact that plea bargaining may give rise to injustices on both sides of the ledger—
when a penal outcome is bargained for, the accused may be subject to more, or less, punishment 
than is her just desert according to law.98 
In Australia, the importance of guilty pleas to the criminal justice system cannot be gainsaid. 
What is less transparent is the role of plea bargaining in underpinning the high proportion of 
findings of ‘guilt’ in dispositions in criminal cases. Addressing that research gap, Flynn and 
Freiberg found that 87% of guilty pleas entered at all levels of Victorian courts were the result 
of a negotiated agreement between the prosecutor and the defence.99 This does not reach the 
dizzying heights claimed of the United States,100 but nonetheless the criminal justice system 
would be unworkable if it routinely required trial in even a modest portion of that 87%. 
An important contrast between the incentivisation that occurs in civil cases via litigation cost 
rules and in criminal cases via plea bargaining is their degree of formality. In civil cases, statutes 
give judges a formal role in managing civil litigation through tailored costs orders. In criminal 
cases, plea bargaining occurs between defence and prosecution away from public oversight and 
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without statutory or judicial regulation of the process.101 This ‘behind closed doors’ approach 
has been facilitated by the High Court, which has assiduously kept the judiciary at arm’s length 
from the prosecutor’s decision as to what charges to lay, and from the defendant’s decision as 
to how to plead.102 In doing so, the cost-effective practice of plea bargaining runs headlong into 
other fundamental values of the justice system, including access to justice (especially for the 
least advantaged), fairness of process, impartiality of decision making, just outcomes according 
to merits, and public confidence in the administration of justice. 
E. Filtering 
The fifth process by which the state curbs demand for the courts is by filtering matters that are 
within the purview of the judicial system, with the objective of ensuring some matters do not 
proceed to determination or do not proceed further than is necessary. Filtration can be 
undertaken by different actors. In the first example considered below, lawyers are used to screen 
out civil cases that lack ‘reasonable prospects of success’, thereby leaving disputants without 
legal representation in less meritorious cases. This has an analogue in criminal cases, although 
only on the side of the Crown, where prosecutors must be satisfied there is sufficient evidence 
to prosecute a case and a ‘reasonable prospect’ of obtaining a conviction.103 In the second 
example discussed below, judges are used to curtail appeals in civil and criminal matters by 
exercising their discretion to grant or refuse leave to appeal. There are other filters on the 
appellate process too, including the substantive rules that authorise appeals and the legal 
standard applied on review,104 but these will not be canvassed here. 
The gatekeeping functions discussed below are two illustrations of filtering, but there are other 
related instances. An important one is the use of case management in civil litigation. 
Traditionally, the adversarial system left the pace of litigation largely in the hands of the parties 
and their lawyers, with the judge assuming the reactive role of umpire.105 Since the 1990s, 
however, ‘Australian courts have become more active in monitoring and managing the conduct 
and progress of cases before them, from the time a matter is lodged to finalisation’.106 Effective 
case management requires coordinated effort from a variety of court personnel, but judges play 
a pivotal role in supervising proceedings to avoid ‘undue delay or unnecessary prolongation of 
trials’.107 The High Court has endorsed this managerial role, strengthening the discretion of a 
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trial judge to take into account ‘concerns of case management’ when making orders regarding 
the conduct of litigation.108 
While case management does not necessarily reduce the number of civil matters lodged in the 
courts, it does aim to promote their timely resolution. It is therefore part of the state’s armoury 
of demand management tools; filtering cases out of the judicial system as efficiently as possible. 
Whether case management has delivered on that promise is a matter requiring empirical 
evaluation. Reporting in 2000, the Australian Law Reform Commission noted that the 
effectiveness of case management systems was largely untested in the federal judicial system 
regarding case duration, case outcomes, and costs.109 More recently, in proposing a conceptual 
framework for measuring timeliness in civil justice, Economides, Haug and McIntyre suggested 
that case management is only one factor amongst many that affect the duration of legal 
proceedings.110 They claimed that such institutional practices were commonly the focus of 
reform initiatives despite the absence of empirical support for their adoption or subsequent 
evaluation of their impact. These issues do not need to be resolved here, but they demonstrate 
that judges can be participants in demand management in ways that reach beyond the two 
illustrations that follow. 
1. Lawyers as Civil Gatekeepers 
Despite the rise of self-represented litigants, many people who use the judicial system engage 
legal representatives to guide them because professional knowledge and experience enhance 
the prospect of a good outcome. By restricting access to legal representation, the state has been 
able to choke off some demand for the courts, albeit with adverse consequences for access to 
justice. These restrictions come in many forms, including the decline in public funding for 
litigation through legal aid,111 and restraints on lawyers’ advertising.112 The focus here is on 
reforms requiring lawyers to assess the merits of civil cases before acting for clients, which co-
opts lawyers as gatekeepers to the civil courts. 
The context of these developments was the ‘civil liability crisis’ discussed in Part V(A). There 
was concern among parliamentarians that courts were being clogged by damages claims that 
were speculative in nature or based on hopeless contentions of law, and that cases were being 
prolonged by defences devoid of factual or legal merit.113 Lawyers were seen to be part of the 
problem. Although lawyers have a paramount ethical duty to the court, which prevails over 
duties to clients,114 the paramount duty was thought inadequate to the task of curbing civil 
litigation. 
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In 2002, the New South Wales Parliament enacted legislation to expand significantly the duties 
of lawyers in damages cases, in terms that have now been modelled in other jurisdictions and 
litigation contexts.115 The crux of the change is that a lawyer must not provide legal services on 
a claim for damages, or a defence to such a claim, unless he or she ‘reasonably believes on the 
basis of provable facts and a reasonably arguable view of the law that the claim or the defence 
… has reasonable prospects of success’. The sanctions for breaching the prohibition include 
disciplinary action for professional misconduct or a personal costs order against the lawyer. 
These provisions require lawyers to assess the merits of a case at the outset—before pleadings, 
argument, or hearing—and to decline to act if the case fails to meet the requisite standard. In 
such a case, the disputant must decide whether to pursue the claim or defence without the 
benefit of legal services.116 The chilling effect on litigation is the raison d’être of the provision, 
and experience in the United States with a cognate provision in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure suggests that it has that effect.117 However, benefits to the administration of justice 
come at the cost of access to justice. There are many landmark cases that had ‘risky origins’, 
and there is a real danger that the provisions will reduce ‘the readiness of lawyers to assist with 
novel or difficult cases’.118 Moreover, the decision to act for a client is made in private by a 
person who is subject to penalty if overzealous in taking on marginal cases. Those 
circumstances test the fairness and impartiality of the decision-making process and may weaken 
public trust in the justice system. If lawyers are to be co-opted as gatekeepers, there is an 
argument for an exception for public interest litigation, allowing a court to order continuation 
of a claim without a lawyer’s certification. 
2. Judges as Appellate Gatekeepers 
In 2019-20, Australian courts finalised 1.23 million matters, but only a tiny number (14,311, or 
1.2%) were appeals.119 What accounts for the small proportion of cases that percolate upward 
through the court hierarchy? Clearly, no judicial system could function effectively if every 
primary decision that a party wished to challenge were in fact reviewed by a higher court. The 
practical necessity for winnowing appeals is achieved in part through the discretion vested in 
judges to select the cases that may be taken on appeal. 
Whenever statute authorises a court to grant leave to appeal, it gives the court a discretionary 
power to filter. The power is sometimes reposed in the court that made the original ruling; but 
more commonly it is given to the court that will hear the full appeal if leave is granted. The 
discretion might be unstructured in its terms, and hence guided by common law principles that 
have evolved to control its exercise; or it may be structured by statutory criteria to which the 
court must or may have regard. The criteria for filtering cases are closely related to the 
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justifications underlying the appellate process itself. Appeals serve two main goals—to 
supervise the exercise of judicial power by lower courts though the correction of errors, and to 
develop the corpus of law through judicial exposition.120 The error correction function 
predominates in intermediate courts of appeal, while the legal development function 
predominates in final courts of appeal; and this is reflected in the criteria for granting leave.121 
This filtering can be seen in the High Court of Australia, which sits at the apex of the judicial 
hierarchy. With very few exceptions, appeals cannot be brought to the High Court without a 
grant of ‘special leave’. In determining an application for special leave, the Court is required to 
consider whether the case involves a question of law of public importance or on which lower 
courts have differences of opinion; or alternatively that the interests of justice require the 
Court’s consideration of the matter ‘either generally or in the particular case’.122 The last two 
words highlight the ‘tension between the Court’s law-making and adjudicative function’.123 
High Court justices have openly acknowledged that the provision was adopted to ‘winnow out 
those cases which are unworthy of its attention’, thus allowing better use of the Court’s 
resources.124 The data bear this out. Figure 6 shows the number of special leave applications 
granted (solid line) relative to the number of applications filed (dashed line) over a 24-year 
period, yielding an average conversion rate of 12%.125 The area between the two lines represents 
the extent of judicial winnowing. 
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Figure 6: High Court of Australia, Special Leave to Appeal, 1996-97 to 2019-20126 
 
 
Sources: High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2019-2020 (2020) and cognate years. 
It is evident that a court of seven justices can render only a finite number of reasoned decisions 
each year, and therefore any excess must be cast off. This impacts adversely on access to justice, 
but the way this is done gives minimal offence to other values of the justice system. There is a 
fair process involving oral or written submissions; impartial adjudication by appellate judges; 
just outcomes in the exercise of a structured statutory discretion; and a high degree of public 
confidence in the process. This is to be expected because the power to filter is a power that must 
be exercised judicially. 
F. Demoting 
The final process by which the state manages demand for the courts is by ‘pushing down’ 
matters within the court hierarchy so they can be disposed of more cheaply and efficiently in 
lower courts; a process that is here called demotion. Reallocating cases between court levels 
does not reduce the total demand for adjudication but it allows demand for the most expensive 
parts of the system to be better regulated. Pushing down occurs in civil and criminal matters, 
but this section illustrates the phenomenon in two civil contexts. The first is the adjudication of 
family law disputes, where the solution has been a structural expansion by creating a new lower 
court; the second is the increase in the monetary limits of lower courts, where the solution has 
been one of jurisdictional expansion. The latter mechanism also has a counterpart in the 
criminal context where there has been a tendency to give Magistrates’ Courts jurisdiction to 
determine an ever-greater range of summary offences, as well as indictable offences triable 
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summarily, when previously a defendant had to be tried on indictment in the higher District or 
Supreme Court.127 
1. Creating New Lower Courts 
Jurisdiction in family law matters has undergone major restructuring over the past 50 years. 
Prior to 1975, family disputes were adjudicated in state courts, but in that year the Australian 
Parliament took over the field of family law in the exercise of its federal legislative powers. It 
created the Family Court of Australia as a specialist federal court with nationwide reach—
except for Western Australia, where a state family court was established to administer the 
federal laws. By 1999-2000, after 25 years of operation, the Family Court had a substantial 
caseload, with over 123,000 annual lodgements, and hefty backlogs. However, from that year 
its caseload plummeted, and it now attracts only one-sixth of the annual lodgements it received 
at its peak (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Family Law Lodgements, 1994-95 to 2019-20 
 
 
Sources: Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2021 (2021) and cognate years. 
 
This precipitous decline is explained by the fact that in 1999 Parliament created another federal 
court—the Federal Circuit Court—to provide cheaper, simpler, and faster methods of dealing 
with less complex civil matters.128 The Circuit Court was intended to ease the workload of the 
Family Court and change the legal culture towards greater informality of proceedings. To 
facilitate an appropriate allocation of cases between them, the Family Court and the Circuit 
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Court were given power to transfer matters to the other on their own initiative and without 
notice to the parties. In relation to downward transfers, the Family Court was authorised to 
consider, inter alia, whether the case could be dealt with faster, at less cost, and with more 
convenience if transferred to the Circuit Court; the financial value of the claim; and the 
complexity of the facts or legal issues involved.129 The effect of the reform is evident in 
Figure 7. There was a rapid increase in lodgements in the Circuit Court in its first few years, 
which has now tapered off.130 By 2008-09, the two courts appeared to have reached a stable 
equilibrium in which the structural changes introduced a decade before had eased the workload 
of the higher court. 
However, as noted in Part I above, the Australian Government’s appetite for structural reform 
in family law disputes has not abated, and in 2021 the two courts were merged into a new entity 
called the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.131 As with earlier reforms, the changes 
have been justified by the government’s (disputed) claim that it will allow family law disputes 
to be ‘dealt with quickly, efficiently, cheaply and as safely as possible’.132 It is telling that a 
significant fillip for the proposal was a commissioned report produced by an international 
accounting firm, whose assessment criteria included the cost of implementing the reforms, the 
ongoing operating cost of supporting the reforms, and the potential efficiency gains for the 
courts.133 In other words, a major focus was on the public fiscal benefits of structural change. 
2. Expanding Jurisdictional Limits of Lower Courts 
Demotion also occurs when legislation alters the relative jurisdictional limits of existing courts. 
In Australia, nearly all lower and intermediate courts have monetary limits on their civil 
jurisdiction. Over time, these limits have been raised in real terms, with the effect of extending 
the jurisdiction of the lowest tier relative to the intermediate tier, and of the intermediate tier 
relative to the upper tier. This allows more civil matters to be commenced lower in the 
hierarchy, and plaintiffs are incentivised to do so by rules relating to court fees and legal 
costs.134 
This can be illustrated using the New South Wales Local Court, which is the lowest tier in that 
state’s judicial hierarchy. In 1972, its monetary limit on civil claims was $500, which is 
equivalent to $5,266 in ‘2019 dollars’. However, the Local Court’s monetary limit today is 
$100,000—200 times the nominal value and nearly 20 times the real value in 1972. This has 
greatly expanded the range of civil matters falling within the Local Court’s jurisdiction.135 
The accretion of jurisdiction is shown in Figure 8. The nominal monetary limit is represented 
by the stepped line, which has increased on seven occasions since 1972 (solid line). Each 
nominal increase draws more jurisdiction to the Local Court, but the real benefit of the 
expansion is eroded by rising prices, until the next nominal increase (dashed line). Despite this, 
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there has been a marked increase in the Court’s real jurisdiction since 1972, represented by the 
area that lies between the dashed line and the dotted line (the latter being the real value in 2019 
dollars of the 1972 limit of $500). 
Legislatures have been candid in explaining the purpose of these periodic recalibrations. The 
Attorney-General justified one such change by the need for the state’s Supreme Court to be 
occupied solely with work of a complexity that comports with its status. He also emphasised 
that expanding the jurisdiction of the lowest court enhanced access to justice because it is 
cheaper and quicker for litigants to have their matters settled in that forum than higher up.136 
What is equally evident is that pushing matters down the court hierarchy is also cost-effective 
for governments that fund the courts. 
Reviewing both the structural and jurisdictional mechanisms described above, it is apparent that 
pushing civil cases down the court hierarchy can make adjudication more cost-effective for the 
state and can promote access to justice for the disputants. Generally, it will do so without 
triggering undue concern about competing fundamental values because dispute resolution in 
lower courts must still be undertaken judicially. Taken to its limit, demotion might suggest that 
all cases should be determined in the lowest tier, but there is a point at which just outcomes 
may be jeopardised. Judicial officers at different levels of the hierarchy have different skills 
and experience; they also have different resources at hand with which to hear and determine 
cases before them. A rational system of justice must find a balance point that accommodates 
the complexity of matters and the capacities of adjudicators so that greater cost-effectiveness is 
not achieved at the expense of fair process or just outcomes. For the most part, however, that is 
an unlikely concern. 
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Figure 8: Monetary Limits of the New South Wales Local Court, 1972-2020 
 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, Dec 2019 (2020); Courts of Petty 
Sessions (Civil Claims) Act 1970 (NSW); Local Court Act 2007 (NSW), as amended. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion has significance for fundamental questions about the justice system—
what role do courts play in resolving justiciable disputes; how has that role changed over time; 
and how might it change in the future? An important conceptual contribution to the debate has 
been the ‘social development model’ of litigation.137 Building on the work of French sociologist 
Émile Durkheim and American legal historian James Hurst,138 this model sees legal institutions 
as responding to evolutionary changes in society, as it pursues a gradual but inexorable path of 
modernisation. In that process, the increasing volume and density of population lead to greater 
opportunities for conflict as traditional social norms erode, which in turn requires an increasing 
role for legal institutions and is reflected in growing court caseloads. 
Although there was a worrying ‘litigation explosion’ at one period in history,139 Durkheim’s 
anticipated effects of modernisation in escalating court caseloads has not been manifested in 
recent times. As noted in Part II, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all 
faced a marked contemporary decline in court filings, at least in civil matters. This theoretically 
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unexpected turn from the courts is also borne out by Australia’s experience. Examining 26 years 
of Productivity Commission financial data, we saw that real expenditure on the courts has 
declined significantly relative to all other areas of government expenditure. Examining 21 years 
of Productivity Commission court lodgement data, we saw there has been a precipitous decline 
in civil matters commenced in Australian courts both in absolute terms and per capita; while in 
criminal matters demand has been steady in absolute terms but has still declined significantly 
per capita. 
The apparent contradiction between theory and praxis is largely explained by recognising that 
recourse to the law and recourse to the courts are not synonymous. In a now famous longitudinal 
study that interrogated Durkheim’s thesis in Spain, Toharia found a dramatic increase in legal 
activity (using notarized documents as an indicator) at the same time as stagnation in litigation 
rates.140 A community’s need to resolve legal disputes does not have to be met solely by resort 
to the courts—some of those needs may go unmet and some may be resolved by other means. 
While there are very few studies of the legal needs of the Australian population,141 the findings 
of Genn’s empirical research in the United Kingdom, Paths to Justice, is apposite: ‘When faced 
with a justiciable event most people simply want to solve the problem or obtain compensation 
for harm and loss.’ She concluded that ‘members of the public want routes that are quick, cheap 
and relatively stress-free’ because ‘people want to get on with their lives as quickly as 
possible’.142 
Where does this leave Australian courts? This article does not provide evidence of a decline in 
the aggregate legal needs of Australians, which would be a highly implausible (albeit 
empirically untested) outcome given the continued growth in population and real economic 
activity (by 43% and 110%, respectively) over the past 25 years. However, it does suggest a 
declining role for the courts in meeting those legal needs. If courts may still be described as the 
‘central suppliers of justice’,143 the accuracy of the description is shakier than it was a 
generation ago because of unparalleled change to the arrangements by which justiciable 
disputes are resolved. 
This article has argued that one of the key drivers of that transformation has been the pressure 
towards greater cost-effectiveness in the delivery of justice, which gained a foothold in 
Australia in the 1990s, with new sensibilities about public sector management, and has 
continued without surcease. Those changes have not been an accident of history but part of a 
deliberate endeavour to confine judicial resolution of disputes to a minimal core. Although a 
variety of actors are now involved in giving effect to a transformed system (private lawyers, 
prosecutors, judges, public servants, etc), most of the fundamental changes have been policy 
initiatives of the executive, buttressed by legislative fiat. This can be seen in the statutory 
provisions underpinning abolition of rights to compensation; court-mandated ADR; expanded 
tribunal jurisdiction; CIN systems; certification of a case’s ‘reasonable prospects of success’; 
filtering of appeals; creation of new lower courts; and expanded jurisdiction of lower courts. In 
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each case, Hansard is replete with justifications based on the cost advantages (to users of the 
justice system and to the state) of the proposed reforms. 
Attention to cost-effectiveness in the justice system is not to be denigrated. Speed and efficiency 
are vital qualities of a system of justice, encapsulated in the aphorism that justice delayed is 
justice denied. For utilitarians, cost-effectiveness has moral weight because public funds saved 
in one sector can be put to account in improving human welfare in others.144 Governments 
therefore have had to think innovatively about their role in supporting the just resolution of 
social conflict. A common thread in that consideration is that courts are often said to be too 
slow and too expensive in achieving adjudicated outcomes, and this has built pressure to curb 
demand for their services. 
Yet greater cost-effectiveness may come at a price to other system values, such as access to 
justice, fair process, impartial decision making, just outcomes, and public trust. Using the 
Australian justice system as its context, this article analysed the processes by which the state 
tempers demand for justice in the courts and illustrated them by reference to case studies in 
civil and criminal matters. It also identified other system values that may be adversely affected 
by these demand-tempering processes, as summarised in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Demand Tempering Processes and Fundamental Values of the Justice System 
 
As the table makes clear, reforms intended to make the justice sector more cost-effective can 
create new stresses at other points in the system. These stresses arise in four ways. They may 
arise because a legal need is no longer being met at all; or because it is being met privately 
outside the justice system; or because it is being met within the justice system but outside the 
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judicial system; or because it is being met at a different point within the judicial system, such 
as in a lower court. 
As noted in Section IV, the fundamental values of the justice system do not always stand in 
opposition—they sometimes support each other. However, where a proposed reform advances 
one value (cost-effectiveness) at the expense of others, the challenge is to find acceptable trade-
offs between them. That evaluation is necessarily contestable because there are legitimate 
differences of opinion about what values underpin the justice system, how changes in those 
values should be measured, and how the measured changes should be aggregated for the 
purpose of arriving at rational decisions. 
In making an evaluation, it is important to recognise that social needs for dispute resolution are 
diverse—covering intimate family relations, small consumer transactions, large commercial 
matters, and personal liberty, to name a few. A plurality of dispute resolution mechanisms is 
necessary and desirable to meet these diverse needs. Moreover, one should approach alternative 
mechanisms from a perspective of neutrality; rejecting a priori assumptions about what has 
conventionally been thought ‘best’, and instead focussing on the values that different 
mechanisms enhance or diminish. On this view, dispute resolution in the private sector is not 
presumptively less desirable than that offered by the courts, so long as essential values are 
preserved. 
The table reveals that some of the managerialist reforms of the past decades have had minimal 
adverse impact on other values of the justice system, and these are generally situations where 
the reformed mode of dispute resolution closely emulates the one it replaced. The clearest 
example is the expanded role of lower courts (either through creation of new courts or 
expansion of their jurisdiction), because other system values are preserved when magistrates 
presiding over lower courts exercise their powers judicially. The same is true when judges filter 
access to appellate courts. It is also the case with the tribunal system, but to a lesser degree, 
where cases must be decided according to law, using fair processes that derive from the ‘gold 
standard’ applied in the courts. 
What is perhaps surprising is that similar conclusions can sometimes be drawn about dispute 
resolution in the private sphere, such as commercial arbitration (where the arbitrator is often a 
retired judge or eminent legal counsel), or sporting bodies that have highly formalised 
approaches to delivering sports justice. In Section V(B) mention was made of the self-
regulatory system of the National Rugby League, whose Code presently runs to 129 pages and 
reads like mixture of criminal statute and rules of court.145 The Code defines 13 offences each 
carrying a pre-determined penalty according to severity; establishes a match review committee 
to investigate breaches and to lay charges against players; appoints an independent prosecutor; 
establishes a judiciary to hear and determine charges, establishes an appeals committee to 
review the judiciary’s decisions; and confers on players a wide range of procedural rights. What 
is key in these examples is not their public or private nature but their commitment to core values 
that also underpin (and perhaps originated in) the judicial system, even if they are delivered 
through more elastic dispute resolution processes. 
On the other hand, some highly cost-effective practices, like plea bargaining, raise multiple red 
flags. The problem is not just the number of fundamental values that may be adversely impacted 
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by the practice but the scale of the problem. If research in Victoria (where 87% of guilty pleas 
are negotiated)146 has wider geographic relevance, plea bargaining has major ramifications 
because around 800,000 criminal matters are finalised in Australian courts every year. 
Moreover, the subject matter of the proceedings has a bearing on how competing values should 
be weighed. Criminal proceedings jeopardise a defendant’s personal liberty or financial 
resources and thus create the greatest need for robust protections. Yet it is in this context that 
non-judicial processes (plea bargaining, infringement notices) have flourished as methods for 
attributing criminal responsibility without the rigours of adjudication. At the tipping point, the 
quest for cost-effectiveness so compromises other values that the process of dispute resolution 
bears only a passing resemblance to a system of justice. The solution, however, is not to reject 
a questionable practice in toto but to shear off the most objectionable attributes of the practice 
to minimise the conflicts with other system values. In the case of plea bargaining, for instance, 
Lippke has shown how this might be done through more-restrained practices that discourage 
over-charging by prosecutors, limit the discount available to defendants for a guilty plea, and 
require greater judicial oversight.147 
In sum, we should not decry reforms that seek a more cost-effective resolution of justiciable 
disputes. However, a system of justice is not reducible to the least-cost method of resolving 
disputes: a commitment to the rule of law necessitates that legal controversies be resolved 
according to law, or in the shadow of the law. Often this demands the exercise of judicial power 
by persons whose independence is the best guarantee of the impartiality of their decisions. As 
a former High Court justice has observed, engaging in that process should not be seen as failure, 
even if it can be slow and expensive.148 We must ensure that, in our quest for affordability, we 
do not pay too high a price by acquiring a system that is merely cheap. 
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